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Foster v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 20, 111 P.3d 1083 (2005).1
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEALS
Summary
Troy Anthony Foster, appellant, was charged with four counts of sexual assault and one
count of kidnapping. A jury found Foster guilty of three counts of sexual assault and acquitted
him on one count of sexual assault and of kidnapping. Foster appealed his conviction asserting
five assignments of error. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Foster’s contentions concluding
in part the evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict.
Foster then filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in district court,
claiming ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. The district court appointed
counsel to represent Foster and conducted an evidentiary hearing. On January 28, 2004 the
district court entered an order rejecting all of Foster’s claims and denying the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.
Foster again filed an appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court asserting a number of claims
of error in the district court’s denial of Foster’s post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Although Foster asserted a number of claims, the Nevada Supreme Court focused
primarily on Foster’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was
violated. Foster claimed his counsel failed to assign any error on direct appeal with regard to the
trial court’s finding that defense counsel violated Batson v. Kentucky.2
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order denying Foster’s postconviction habeas petition. The court concluded Foster’s contentions that the district court erred
in rejecting his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel were without merit.
The court reasoned that Foster had failed to show the prejudice necessary to establish any
entitlement to relief on any of his claims relating to his trial counsel’s failure to object to the trial
court’s Batson decision and remedy or appellate counsel’s decision to assert any claims of error
on appeal with the trial court’s remedy of the Batson issue. The court further reviewed the
remainder of Foster’s claims of error in connection with the denial of the post-conviction habeas
corpus petition and thereto found that Foster failed to show the prejudice necessary to establish
any entitlement to relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court did
reserve for a more appropriate case a more definitive decision of what remedy best serves to
vindicate in Nevada courts the multiple interests that Batson protects.3
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The holding in Batson serves to protect three interests that are threatened by discriminatory jury selection: (1) the
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in the fairness of our system of justice. Id. At 86-87.
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Issue and Disposition
Issue
Does a violation of Batson infringe upon a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
effective counsel when on direct appeal counsel fails to assign any error to the trial court’s
remedy of reseating the juror who had been improperly peremptorily challenged?
Disposition
No. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision in rejecting
Foster’s post-conviction habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because
Foster failed to demonstrate prejudice sufficient to entitle relief. Therefore, Foster’s Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel was not violated.
Commentary
State of the Law Prior to Foster
In Nevada, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is subject to independent review.4
Independent review is proper where the claim presents a mixed question of law and fact.5 A
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.6 The key for the
court in evaluating “an ineffectiveness claim is whether the proper function of the adversarial
process was so undermined by counsel’s conduct that the reviewing court cannot trust that the
trial produced a just result.”7
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must meet the test
established in Strickland v. Washington.8 In Strickland, the test starts with a strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct falls within reasonable professional assistance. The petitioner must show
that counsels’ performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.9 However, if a petitioner fails to make a sufficient
showing on either prong of the test, the court does not need to consider the remaining prong.10
The habeas corpus petitioner must carry the burden of proving the disputed factual allegations
underlying the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence.11
The Strickland test applies to reviews of claims asserting ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel.12 To establish prejudice based on deficient assistance of appellate counsel, the
petitioner must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success
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on appeal.13 The Nevada Supreme Court has noted that appellate counsel need not raise every
issue to provide effective assistance but is entitled to make tactical decisions to limit the scope of
an appeal to issues the counsel determines have the highest probability of success. As the
Nevada Supreme Court has stated “a tactical decision . . . is ‘virtually unchallengeable absent
extraordinary circumstances.’”14
The petitioner must establish the counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
Specifically, the petitioner must make a showing there is a reasonable probability that “but for
counsels’ unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”15 A
reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.16
The assessment of counsel’s performance is reviewed under the circumstances and from
counsel’s perspective at the time of action; not from hindsight.17
The Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged it had not previously addressed the
appropriate remedy for a Batson violation. A Batson violation is one were counsel uses a
peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race18 or gender.19 In determining
whether peremptory challenges have been used in a discriminatory manner, the complaining
party “must [first] make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination.” Next the party
accused of discriminatory challenges must offer a gender or race-neutral explanation for striking
the jurors. The trial court must then decide whether the complaining party has carried his burden
of proving purposeful discrimination. The Batson decision did not specify the appropriate
remedy when a violation has been proven.20
Other Jurisdictions
The Nevada Supreme Court noted the Batson decision expressly left to the state courts
how best to implement its holding. State courts have generally used three approaches in
implementing the Batson holding.21 Some jurisdictions mandate trial courts to disallow a
peremptory strike made in violation of Batson or to reseat the improperly stricken juror.22 Other
jurisdictions require the trial court to discharge the venire and commence a new jury selection
from an entirely different venire.23 However, the majority of courts have delegated the
determination of the appropriate remedy for a Batson violation to the discretion of the trial
judge.24
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In the case at bar, the remedy the trial court exercised, reseating the challenged juror has
been held to be an appropriate means of addressing a Batson violation.25 The Nevada Supreme
Court found the trial court offered Foster’s counsel the choice of starting over with an entirely
new venire or of continuing with the same venire with the last juror reinstated to the panel.
Foster’s counsel made a strategic decision to continue with the same venire – all of which was
done out of the presence of the venire. Under the particular circumstances of this case, the
reinstatement of the juror in question did not offend Foster’s rights under the United States
Constitution.
Effect of Foster on Current Law
The Foster court concluded Foster failed to establish the prejudice necessary to entitle
him to relief on his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assign error with
respect to the trial court’s resolution of the Batson violation. However, the court expressed its
preference that the trial courts in the state should follow the American Bar Association Standard
recommending that all peremptory challenges to the jury venire should be exercised outside the
presence of the venire.26
The court further expressed if the juror whom the peremptory challenge was exercised
against is reseated and a curative instruction requested, the curative instruction should be given
on the record for purposes of review.
Unanswered Questions
The court held Foster failed to prove the trial court erred by reseating the challenged juror
as an appropriate remedy for a Batson violation. However, the court declined to engage in a
comprehensive analysis of the appropriate remedy for a Batson violation in the context of a postconviction appeal. The court explicitly limited its holding in Foster and reserved for another
more appropriate case a definitive decision on what remedy best serves the multiple interests
Batson protects.
Conclusion
Although the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Foster’s postconviction petition of writ of habeas corpus, it limited the holding to those facts and
circumstances of this case that reseating the challenged juror was an appropriate remedy. The
court left open the door for a future case to determine the appropriate remedy for a Batson
violation.
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